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In second-price auctions with interdependent values, bidders do not
necessarily have dominant strategies. Moreover, such auctions may have
many equilibria. In order to rule out the less intuitive equilibria, we de-
fine the notion of distributional strictly perfect equilibrium (DSPE) for
Bayesian games with infinite type and action spaces. This equilibrium is
robust against arbitrary small perturbations of strategies. We apply DSPE
to a class of symmetric second-price auctions with interdependent values.
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1 Introduction
In private value second-price auctions each bidder has a dominant strategy in
which he bids his own valuation of the object. However, in second-price auctions
with interdependent values bidders may not have dominant strategies while there
may exist multiple equilibria in undominated strategies. For example Birulin
(2003) [13] shows that any auction with an efficient ex-post equilibrium has a
continuum of inefficient undominated ex-post equilibria. Therefore, a selection
tool is needed in such Bayesian games to rule out the less intuitive equilibria.
We develop a concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium for Bayesian games
with infinite type and action spaces, called distributional strictly perfect equilib-
rium (DSPE). In this equilibrium concept, players’ strategies are robust against
any slight perturbations of their opponents’ strategies.
In finite normal form games, DSPE is equivalent to strictly perfect equilibrium
by Okada (1981) [30], 1 as both definitions require robustness against arbitrary
slight perturbations of strategies. It is known that strictly perfect equilibrium
may not exist (see example 1.5.5 in van Damme [35]), therefore DSPE may not
exist even in finite games. However, we can prove existence of a weaker notion
of DSPE, which is called distributional perfect equilibrium, in Bayesian games
for which the type space of each player is a separable metric space, the action
space of each player is a compact metric space, and player types are drawn from
a prior probability measure on the product of the type spaces that is absolutely
continuous with respect to the product measure of its marginal probabilities. 2 3
We apply this notion of perfection to second price auctions with interdependent
values in order to select among equilibria. In our auction model, there is one
continuous and efficient equilibrium introduced by Milgrom (1981) [28] and a
set of inefficient ex-post equilibria introduced by Birulin [13]. All of these equi-
libria are undominated and there is no dominant strategy. Furthermore, all these
equilibria all ex-post, so ex-post cannot be used as a selection criterion in this
1The proof is available upon request.
2This property is called absolute continuity of information in Milgrom and Weber [29].
3For further studies on the existence of equilibrium in Bayesian games, we refer to Athey [3],
Mcadams [24], Reny [32], Jackson et al. [18],[19], Mertens [27], Meirowitz [25], Milgrom and
Weber [29], Mallozzi et al. [26], Kim and Yannelis [20], Zandt and Vives [38], and Balder [7].
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model. We prove that the efficient equilibrium due to Milgrom [28] is DSPE, but
the one’s constructed in Birulin [13] are not. In other words, our results show that
the efficient and continuous equilibrium is robust against arbitrary slight pertur-
bation of strategies, while other discontinuous and inefficient equilibria are not.
These discontinuous equilibria contain either overbidding or underbidding when
compared with the efficient strategy profile by Milgrom [28]. We show that if
each bidder believes that with a very small probability her opponent can bid ac-
cording to the efficient bidding strategy, then overbidding or underbidding is not
a best response.
Bajoori et al. (2016) [6] define the notion of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
and apply this notion to an example in interdependent value auctions. In a Perfect
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium the strategies are robust against some slight pertur-
bations of strategies. This definition is weaker than the notion of DSPE, but it is
not strong enough to exclude all the discontinuous and inefficient equilibria in a
more general model of an interdependent value auction.
To the best of our knowledge there is not much research done on the theory of
equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions. However, there are some
relatively recent studies on the equilibrium selection in common value auctions
such as Parreiras (2006) [31], Abraham et al. (2012) [2], Cheng and Tan (2008)
[14], Larson (2009) [22], and Liu (2014) [23]. In the most relevant study by
Liu [23], they use noisy bids rather than strategy perturbations. In their model,
bidders need to believe that any bid is possible for their opponent even if this
strategy does not have full support. They show that the continuous set of equilib-
ria introduced by Milgrom [28] are robust against such noisy bids, while the set
of discontinuous equilibria (similar to the ones introduced by Birulin [13]) are
not. Our paper does not cover the case of common values, so that our results are
disjoint from those in Liu [22].
Another relevant strand of literature is by Bergemann and Morris (2005) [9] on
robust mechanism design. They show that, within the class of separable envi-
ronments, interim implementability of a social choice correspondence for any
given type space is equivalent to implementability in ex post equilibrium. Thus,
in their approach, ex post equilibrium is used as the basic solution concept for
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robust implementation. However, as we already mentioned, it is well known in
the literature on auction design that ex post equilibrium may often be inefficient,
and the refinement we propose often rules out the inefficient equilibria. Thus, our
approach may in the future have consequences for mechanism design as well.
To illustrate our results, we discuss the following example.
Example 1.1 Consider a 2-bidder second-price auction with interdependent val-
ues v1 = t1 + 12t2 and v2 =
1
2
t1 + t2. Types t1, t2 for bidder 1 and 2 are drawn
independently from [0, 1] according to the uniform distribution. Each bidder
simultaneously submits a bid from the set [0, 3
2
]. The efficient equilibrium intro-
duced by Milgrom [28] is the strategy pair (b1, b2) in which bi = 32ti for every
bidder i = 1, 2. We can show that this equilibrium is robust against any slight
perturbations of the strategies (Proposition 4.1). On the other hand, the class of
inefficient ex post equilibria introduced by Birulin [13] are as follows. For fixed
s1, s2 ∈ [0, 1] with s1 < s2, define
bˆ1(t1) =
{
s2 +
1
2
t1 if t1 ∈ [s1, s2]
3
2
t1 otherwise,
bˆ2(t2) =
{
s1 +
1
2
t2 if t2 ∈ [s1, s2]
3
2
t2 otherwise.
An example of such an equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1. In each such an
equilibrium, when the realizations of both types are within the set [s1, s2], bidder
1 wins the auction and pays the amount bˆ2(t2) = s1 + 12t2, which is his minimum
ex post valuation. Thus, in this case bidder 1 overbids, while bidder 2 underbids.
So, since such equilibria lead to inefficient outcomes, we would like to be able to
rule them out. Proposition 4.3 shows that the equilibria (bˆ1, bˆ2) are not DSPEs.
Intuitively, to exclude such equilibria it is enough to make the bidders believe
that with a tiny probability their opponents bid according to the efficient bidding
strategy. Then, the overbidding (underbidding) is not a best response against
underbidding (overbidding).
The paper is structured as follows. First, we provide some preliminary notions
in Section 2. In section 3 we introduce the concept of distributional strictly
perfection. In section 4, first we present our interdependent value auction model.
Then, we have two subsections; one on selected equilibrium and the other on
discarding equilibria.
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1
2
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Figure 1
2 Preliminaries
A Bayesian game Γ is defined as follows. There are n players. For each player i,
the set Ti of types is a complete separable metric space, and the set Ai of actions
is a compact metric space. Let dTi and dAi denote the respective metrics, and let
Ti andAi denote the induced Borel σ-fields on Ti andAi respectively. Moreover,
let T = ×ni=1Ti and A = ×ni=1Ai.
Let µ be a probability measure on the product σ-field T = ⊗ni=1Ti with marginal
probability µi on Ti for every player i. We assume that each µi is a completely
mixed probability measure. 4
Player i’s payoff function pii : T ×A→ IR is assumed to be bounded and jointly
measurable.
We define two classes of strategies: behavioral strategies and distributional strate-
gies. We also define Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE).
A pure strategy for player i in Γ is a measurable function pi : Ti → Ai. A
behavioral strategy for player i is a function βi : Ti ×Ai → [0, 1] such that
[1] the section function βi(ti, ·) : Ai → [0, 1] is a probability measure for
every ti ∈ Ti, and
[2] the section function βi(·, B) : Ti → [0, 1] is measurable for every B ∈ Ai.
When player i plays according to the behavioral strategy βi, for each type ti ∈ Ti,
he chooses his action according to the probability measure βi(ti, ·).
4A probability measure is completely mixed if it assigns strictly positive weight to every
nonempty open set.
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A behavioral strategy βi for player i is called pure if there is a pure strategy pi for
player i such that βi(ti, ·) = Dpi(ti)(·) for every type ti ∈ Ti, where D denotes
Dirac measure. For simplicity, we denote this pure behavioral strategy by pi.
Following Milgrom and Weber [29], a distributional strategy for player i in a
Bayesian game is a probability measure γi on Ti × Ai such that the marginal
distribution of γi on Ti equals the probability measure µi. That is, γi(U ×Ai) =
µi(U) for everyU ∈ Ti. Given a behavioral strategy βi, the induced distributional
strategy γi is uniquely determined by
γi(U ×B) =
∫
U
βi(ti, B) µi(dti)
for every rectangle U × B ∈ Ti ⊗ Ai. This induces a many-to-one mapping
from behavioral strategies to distributional strategies that preserves the players’
ex ante expected payoffs.
The vector β = (β1, β2, . . . , βn), where βi is player i’s behavioral strategy, is
called a behavioral strategy profile. For every player i we write β−i = (βj)ni 6=j=1
to denote the behavioral strategy profile for his opponents. The definitions are
similar for distributional strategies.
Let ∆i be the set of all distributional strategies for player i and ∆ = ×ni=1∆i. Let
Πi : ∆→ IR be the expected payoff of player i playing distributional strategy γi
against a distributional strategy profile γ−i. So,
Πi(γi, γ−i) =
∫
pii(t, a) γi(dai | ti)γ−i(da−i | t−i) µ(dt),
where t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T , a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A, and γi(dai | ti) is a version
of conditional probability on Ai given ti. By integrals with respect to γ−i(da−i |
t−i) we mean the iterated integrals with respect to γj(daj | tj) for all j 6= i.
As the measure µ is absolutely continuous with respect to µˆ, by the Radon-
Nikodym theorem there is a measurable function f : T → IR such that for every
measurable set G ∈ T we have µ(G) =
∫
G
fdµˆ. Therefore, the expected payoff
Πi can be expressed in an easier form as
Πi(γi, γ−i) =
∫
pii(t, a)f(t) dγidγ−i.
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Let βi be a behavioral strategy corresponding to the distributional strategy γi, for
every player i. Then, by Theorem 10.2.1 in Dudley [15] 5 we conclude that
Πi(γi, γ−i) =
∫
pii(t, a)f(t) βi(ti, dai) µi(dti) β−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i).
By Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) we denote player i’s expected payoff given his behavioral
strategy βi and his type ti against a behavioral strategy profile β−i. Thus,
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) =
∫
pii(t, a)f(t) βi(ti, dai) β−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i).
Furthermore, notice that
Πi(γ1, . . . , γn) =
∫
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) µi(dti).
In the special case where player i chooses a pure behavioral strategy pi, his ex-
pected payoff is
Πbi(pi, β−i | ti) =
∫
pii (t, (pi(ti), a−i)) f(t) β−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i).
One can also define Πbi(σi, β−i | ti) and Πbi(ai, β−i | ti) respectively for every
probability measure σi on Ai and every action ai ∈ Ai.
A probability measure σi on Ai is called a best response of player i for type
ti ∈ Ti against a behavioral strategy profile τ−i, if for every probability measure
σ′i on Ai we have
Πbi(σi, τ−i | ti) ≥ Πbi(σ′i, τ−i | ti).
The set of such best responses is denoted by BRi(ti, τ). A behavioral strategy
βi is called a best response of player i against the behavioral strategy profile
τ−i, if βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, τ) for every ti ∈ Ti. A behavioral strategy profile
5Dudley’s notation and terminology in [15] differs from ours. Part (II) of Theorem 10.2.1. in
Dudley [15] with our terminology can be expressed as follows: For every measurable function
g : Ti ×Ai → IR we have∫
Ti×Ai
g dγi =
∫
Ti
∫
Ai
g βi(ti, dai) µi(dti).
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β = (β1, . . . , βn) is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) if βi is a best response
to β−i for every player i.
A distributional strategy γi of player i is a best response against a distributional
strategy profile η−i, if Πi(γi, η−i) ≥ Πi(γ˜i, η−i), for every distributional strategy
γ˜i of player i. Let BRi : ∆  ∆i denote the best response correspondence for
player i on the set of distributional strategies. Moreover, define BR : ∆  ∆,
for every γ ∈ ∆, as BR(γ) = ×ni=1BRi(γ).
We say that a behavioral strategy βi (weakly) dominates behavioral strategy βˆi
if, for their respective induced distributional strategies γi and γˆi, it holds that
Πi(γi, γ−i) ≥ Πi(γˆi, γ−i)
for all γ−i ∈ ∆−i, and with a strict inequality for at least one γ−i ∈ ∆−i. A
behavioral strategy βi is called (weakly) dominant if it dominates every other
behavioral strategy of player i. A behavioral strategy βi is undominated if there
is no other behavioral strategy that dominates βi.
3 Distributional strictly perfect equilibrium
In this section, we define perfect equilibrium for Bayesian games in terms of
behavioral strategies. Since only the induced distribution on opponents’ actions
matter for computation of expected payoffs, we use distributional strategies as a
tool to verify whether the behavioral strategy profile satisfies the conditions of
trembling hand perfect equilibrium.
Let Cb(Ti × Ai) be the set of all continuous and bounded functions with domain
Ti × Ai. The weak topology on ∆i is the coarsest topology for which all the
maps γi →
∫
h dγi, h ∈ Cb(Ti×Ai) are continuous. Since Ti×Ai is a separable
metric space, the weak topology on ∆i is separable and metrizable with the weak
(Prohorov) metric 6, denoted by ρw.
6See Aliprantis and Border [1]. Let µ and ν be two probability measures on a σ-field Σ.
Weak (Prohorov) metric is defined for µ and ν by ρw(µ, ν) = inf{ε > 0 | ∀B ∈ Σ : µ(B) <
ν(Bε) + ε and ν(B) < µ(Bε) + ε}.
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Definition 3.1 A behavioral strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn) is called distri-
butional strictly perfect equilibrium (DSPE) if, given the induced profile γ =
(γ1, . . . , γn) of distributional strategies, for every completely mixed strategy pro-
file ν = (ν1, . . . , νn) and every sequence (εki )
∞
k=1 of real numbers converging to
zero, the sequence (γki )
∞
k=1 defined by γ
k
i = (1 − εik) · γi + εki · νi for every i is
such that
lim
k→∞
ρw(γki , BRi(γ
k)) = 0,
in which γk = (γk1 , . . . , γ
k
n).
A behavioral strategy profile is a distributional strictly perfect BNE if it is both
distributionally strictly perfect and a BNE.
We can show that DSPE is a refinement of BNE for almost all types of the play-
ers:
Proposition 3.2 For every DSPE β, there is a BNE βˆ such that for every player
i we have βi(ti, ·) = βˆi(ti, ·), for µi-a.e. ti ∈ Ti.
Proof. : See appendix.
The above equilibrium concept may not exist even in finite games. DSPE is
equivalent to strictly perfect equilibrium in finite normal form games 7 and we
see that in example 1.5.5 in van Damme [35] there is no strictly perfect equi-
librium. However, we can define a weaker version of DSPE that is called dis-
tributional perfect equilibrium and prove that for every Bayesian game, the set
of distributional BNEs is not empty under two additional assumptions: First, the
measure µ to be absolutely continuous 8 with respect to µˆ = ×ni=1µi. 9 Second,
payoffs to be continuous in actions for every type, that is, pii(t, ·) : A → IR is
continuous for every t ∈ T .
A behavioral strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn) is called distributional perfect
if for the induced distributional strategy profile γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) there exists a
7The proof is available upon request
8Let µ and ν be two measures on a σ-field Σ. The measure µ is absolutely continuous with
respect to ν if for every G ∈ Σ, ν(G) = 0 implies µ(G) = 0.
9In Milgrom and Weber [29] this property is called Absolutely Continuous Information. Ab-
solutely continuous information is a rather weak assumption. It is satisfied when the type spaces
are finite, or when each player’s type is drawn independently from his type space.
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sequence (γk)∞k=1 = (γ
k
1 , . . . , γ
k
n)
∞
k=1 of completely mixed distributional strategy
profiles such that for every player i it holds that
(i) lim
k→∞
ρw(γki , γi) = 0,
(ii) lim
k→∞
ρw(γki , BRi(γ
k)) = 0.
A behavioral strategy profile is a distributional perfect BNE if it is both distribu-
tional perfect and a BNE.
We can show that the set of distributional perfect BNEs is nonempty. The proof
can be found in the appendix and it is based on the existence proof in Simon and
Stinchcombe [34] and Milgrom and Weber [29].
4 Interdependent value auctions
In this section we study symmetric second-price auctions with interdependent
values for two bidders and apply strict distributional perfection in this context.
Let Λ be the following sealed-bid second-price auction for a single indivisible
object. There are 2 bidders. Prior to bidding, each bidder i receives a private
signal ti ∈ Ti = [t, t], which is called the type of bidder i. Signals are drawn
independently according to a distribution µi. Bidder i’s valuation of the object
may depend on both types and is denoted by vi(t1, t2). Each bidder i, after ob-
serving his own type, submits a bid from a set Ai independently of his opponent,
where Ai is sufficiently large in the sense that it contains the range of vi. Given
the bids submitted by the bidders, the highest bid wins the auction for the price
equal to the second highest bid. 10 Suppose the following assumptions in this
auction:
[1] v1(t, t) = v2(t, t), for every t ∈ [t, t].
[2] vi is continuously differentiable.
[3] vi is strictly increasing in ti and increasing in tj for j 6= i.
10In the event of a tie for the highest bid, the winner is chosen according to a probability
distribution which may depend on the identity of the highest bidder and his type as well. In our
setting, a tie will only occur with probability 0, even given the type of one bidder, which makes
the specification of this tie-breaking rule irrelevant for the expected profits.
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[4] For every t1, t2 such that v1(t1, t2) = v2(t1, t2), we have
∂vi
∂ti
(t1, t2) >
∂vj
∂ti
(t1, t2).
Condition [4] is called the pairwise single crossing condition. Note that this con-
dition in combination with condition [1] ensures that the bidder with the higher
type has the higher ex post valuation. 11 Moreover, the pair of strategies (b1, b2)
in which bi = vi(ti, ti) for every bidder i, is an efficient equilibrium. 12 More
information on pairwise single crossing condition can be found in for example
Krishna [21].
In the auction Λ the set of available bids for bidder i is an interval Ai = [a, a],
where vi(t, t) = a and vi(t, t) = a, for i = 1, 2. In this auction bidders do not
have any dominant strategy (disregarding the classic case of private values for a
moment), and there are many equilibria.
In the next two subsections we show how DSPE can be used to refine among
these equilibria. We show that the efficient equilibrium introduced in Milgrom
[28] is a DSPE. In contrast with this, we show that within the class of inefficient
equilibria introduced in Birulin [13] none of them are DSPE.
4.1 Equilibrium refinement I: equilibrium selection
Define the strategy pair (b1, b2) by b1(t1) = v1(t1, t1) and b2(t2) = v2(t2, t2). In
Proposition 4.1 we show that this strategy profile is a DSPE. We also argue that
the BNE is not in dominant strategies (unless we are considering the special case
of pure private values). Thus, dominance cannot be used as a means to refine
among equilibria in this context.
Proposition 4.1 The strategy pair (b1, b2), where bi = vi(ti, ti) for i = 1, 2 is a
BNE and DSPE. Further, bi is undominated for every bidder i.
Proof. First we show that (b1, b2) is a BNE. Define w(t) = v1(t, t) for every
t ∈ [t, t]. Clearly w is an increasing bijection from [t, t] to [a, a]. Suppose that
11Thus, common value auctions do not satisfy pairwise single crossing condition.
12An outcome in the auction is called efficient if the winner is the one with the highest ex post
valuation.
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bidder 1 uses bid function b1(t1) = v1(t1, t1). The expected payoff of bidder 2
having type t2 and bidding p2 is:
Πb2(b1, p2 | t2) =
∫ w−1(p2)
t
(v2(t1, t2)− v1(t1, t1)) µ1(dt1).
As v2 is strictly increasing in the second argument, and moreover
v2(t1, t2)− v1(t1, t1) = v2(t1, t2)− v2(t1, t1),
it is clear that v2(t1, t2)−v1(t1, t1) ≥ 0 precisely when t1 ≤ t2. So, the maximum
of Πbi(b1, p2 | t2) is obtained by choosing p2 such that w−1(p2) = t2. Hence, the
optimal bidding strategy is
b2(t2) = w(t2) = v1(t2, t2) = v2(t2, t2).
Now, we prove that the BNE (b1, b2) is a DSPE. Let γi be the distributional
strategy induced by bi. For every k ∈ IN define γk1 = (1− εk) ·γ1 + εk ·ν1, where
εk ∈ (0, 1), εk → 0 as k → ∞, and ν1 is any completely mixed distributional
strategy on the product space T1 × A1. 13
It suffices to show that for each k there is a strategy ηk2 ∈ BR2(γk1 ) such that
lim
k→∞
ρw(γ2, η
k
2) = 0.
The proof is in two steps. Let t2 be a type of bidder 2.
A. We show that p2 = b2 is the unique maximizer of F (p2) = Πb2(b1, p2 | t2)
and F (p2) is continuous. Recall that
F (p2) = Π
b
2(b1, p2 | t2) =
∫ w−1(p2)
t
(v2(t1, t2)− v1(t1, t1)) µ1(dt1),
where w denotes the strictly increasing function w(t) = v1(t, t). Since the inte-
grand
v2(t1, t2)− v1(t1, t1) = v2(t1, t2)− v2(t1, t1)
is continuous and strictly decreasing in t1, and w−1(p2) is continuous and strictly
increasing in p2, it is clear that F (p2) is continuous. Further, since the integrand
13That is, ν1 is a completely mixed measure on T1×A1 and ν1(S1×A1) = µ1(S1) for every
S1 ∈ T1.
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is zero at t1 = t2, it is also clear that F (p2) has a unique maximum location at
value p2 with w−1(p2) = t2. Thus,
p2 = w(t2) = v1(t2, t2) = v2(t2, t2) = b2(t2)
is the unique maximizer of F (p2).
B. We prove that for each k there is a strategy ηk2 ∈ BR2(γk1 ) such that
lim
k→∞
ρw(γ2, η
k
2) = 0.
Let p2 be a pure behavioral strategy for bidder 2 and σ2 be the distributional
strategy induced by p2. Then, the expected payoff of bidder 2 choosing σ2 against
γk1 is:
Π2(γ
k
1 , σ2) =
∫ ∫
p2>a1
(v2(t1, t2)− a1) dγk1dσ2
=
∫
T2
∫
p2>a1
(v2(t1, t2)− a1) dγk1µ2(dt2)
=
∫
T2
Πb2(β
k
1 , p2 | t2) µ2(dt2),
where βk1 is a behavioral strategy corresponding to γ
k
1 for every k ∈ IN. Let bk2
be any maximizer of Πb2(β
k
1 , p2 | t2) for every k, where
Πb2(β
k
1 , p2 | t2) = (1− εk)
∫
p2>a1
(v2(t1, t2)− a1) dγ1
+ εk
∫
p2>a1
(v2(t1, t2)− a1) dν1
= (1− εk)
∫ w−1(p2)
t
(v2(t1, t2)− v1 (t1, t1)) µ1(dt1)
+ εk
∫
p2>a1
(v2(t1, t2)− a1) dν1
= (1− εk) Πb2(b1, p2 | t2) + εk
∫
p2>a1
(v2(t1, t2)− a1) dν1.
Note that the maximizer bk2 exists, because Π
b
2(β
k
1 , p2 | t2) is a continuous func-
tion over the compact set T2. We know that p2 = b2 is the unique maximizer
of Πb2(b1, p2 | t2). Thus, according to Lemma 6.1, we have that bk2 converges to
b2 when k → ∞. Now, let ηk2 be the induced distributional strategy by bk2. As
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bk2 ∈ BR2(t2, βk1 ), then we have ηk2 ∈ BR2(γk1 ). Furthermore, since bk2(t2) con-
verges to b2(t2) for every t2 ∈ T2, we conclude ρw(γ2, ηk2) −→ 0 when k →∞.
With a similar argument for bidder 2, we can conclude that (b1, b2) is a DSPE.
Finally, as bidding b2 is the unique best response for bidder 2 against b1, we
conclude that b2 is undominated. A similar argument holds for b1.
In the next proposition we prove that this strategy pair is not in dominant strate-
gies, unless we are in the pure private values case.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that the valuation function vi is not private values.
Then the strategy bi = vi(ti, ti) is not dominant.
Proof. Assume that v1 is not private values. We prove that b1 = v1(t1, t1) is
not a dominant strategy. In particular, we construct a bid function d2 for bidder
2 and an open set I1 of types for bidder 1, such that there is a bid a ∈ A1 for
bidder 1 that yields a strictly higher payoff against d2 than b1(t1) = v1(t1, t1) for
any type t1 ∈ I1, . This then is a sufficient argument.
Since v1 is not private values, by condition [3] there is an s1 in T1 and an open
set B2 in T2 such that the map v1(s1, ·) : T2 → A2 is strictly increasing on B2.
Suppose that B2 ∩ [t, s1) is not empty. Then we may assume that t2 < s1 for all
t2 ∈ B2. Then, for every t2 ∈ B2 we have v1(s1, t2) < v1(s1, s1). Define
y(t1) =
∫ t1
t
v1(t1, t2) µ2(dt2).
Since v1(s1, t2) ≤ v1(s1, s1) for every t2 < s1, and v1(s1, t2) < v1(s1, s1) for
every t2 ∈ B2, it follows that
y(s1) =
∫ s1
t
v1(s1, t2) µ2(dt2) < v1(s1, s1) = b1(s1).
So, y(s1) < b1(s1). Since t < s1 and b1 is strictly increasing and continuous,
there is u1 < s1 with b1(u1) > y(s1).
Take I1 = (u1, s1). Then, since y and b1 are strictly increasing functions, for
every t1 ∈ I1 we have y(t1) < y(s1) < b1(u1) < b1(t1).
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Take the (constant) bid function d2(t2) = b1(u1) for every t2 ∈ T2 for bidder
2. Take t1 ∈ I1 and any t2 ∈ T2. Since bidder 1 bids according to b1(t1), and
d2(t2) = b1(u1) < b1(t1), bidder 1 wins the auction. Consequently, his expected
payoff against d2 is∫
T2
(v1(t1, t2)− b1(u1)) µ2(dt2) = y(t1)− b1(u1) < 0.
A similar argument applies to the case where B2 ∩ (s1, t] is not empty. This
concludes the proof.
4.2 Equilibrium refinement II: discarding equilibria
Birulin in [13] on page 678 introduces the following class of discontinuous asym-
metric strategy profiles:
For given s1, s2 ∈ [t, t] with s1 < s2, define the strategy pair (bˆ1, bˆ2) by
bˆ1(t1) =
{
v2(t1, s2) if t1 ∈ [s1, s2]
v1(t1, t1) otherwise,
bˆ2(t2) =
{
v1(s1, t2) if t2 ∈ [s1, s2]
v2(t2, t2) otherwise.
Birulin [13] shows that, under pairwise single crossing condition, the strategy
pair (bˆ1, bˆ2) is an ex post equilibrium that allocates the object inefficiently. More-
over, this equilibrium may be in undominated strategies. In the equilibrium
above, bidder 1 overbids and bidder 2 underbids for types between s1 and s2.
In the proposition below we prove that strict distributional perfection rules out
these equilibria. 14 The intuition behind this result is that if there is a small
chance that one bidder bids bi = vi(ti, ti) for ti ∈ [s1, s2] instead of bˆi, then bˆj
will no longer be a best response for bidder j, where j 6= i. In other words,
underbidding (overbidding) would not be a best response against overbidding
(underbidding) if even with a tiny probability one bidder bids according to the
efficient bidding strategy bi = vi(ti, ti). As an extreme case, we see that the
14In finite games, an equilibrium is perfect if and only if it is in undominated strategies. This
is in general not true in games with infinite action spaces, even if undominatedness is replaced
by limit undominatedness. Bajoori et. al in [5] give a detailed analysis on this issue. They prove
that, in normal form games under appropriate assumptions, every weak perfect equilibrium is in
limit undominated strategies, but not vice versa. Example 6 in Bajoori et. al [5] provides the
relevant counter-example.
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ex post equilibrium 15 in which one bidder always bids a and the other bidder
always bids a is not a DSPE.
Proposition 4.3 The equilibrium (bˆ1, bˆ2) is not a DSPE.
Proof. We prove the proposition in two parts. Before we need to define the
followings:
Let c(t2) = v2(s1, t2). For every λ > 0 define ε = ε(λ) to be
ε =
v2(s1, s1 + λ)− v1(s1, s1 + λ)
2
=
c(s1 + λ)− bˆ2(s1 + λ)
2
.
By pairwise single crossing we have ε > 0, also smaller λ generates smaller ε.
Therefore, we can choose λ small enough such that
1. s1 + λ+ ε < s2 − ε,
2. µ2(s1 + ε+ λ, s2 − ε) > ε,
Moreover, for every t2 ∈ (s1 + λ, s2) define
Bt2 =
(
bˆ2(t2)− ε, bˆ2(t2) + ε
)
.
Part A. We show that there is a completely mixed behavioral strategy ηˆ1 such
that if bidder 1 bids according to
βk1 (t1) = (1− 2δk)bˆ1(t1) + δkb1(t1) + δkηˆ1(t1),
where b1(t1) = v1(t1, t1), and δk → 0 when k → ∞, then for every t2 ∈
(s1 + λ, s2), bidding according to b˜2(t2) = v2(s1, t2) generates higher expected
payoff than bidding a2 ∈ (Bt2)ε against βk1 for every k.
By pairwise single crossing, we have bˆ2(t2) = v1(s1, t2) < v2(s1, t2) = c(t2).
Also, for every a2 ∈ (Bt2)ε, we have a2 < c(t2). Let η1 be any completely mixed
behavioral strategy. Define
D1(a2) =
∫ b1−1(c2)
t
(v2−v1(t1, t1)) µ(dt1)−
∫ b1−1(a2)
t
(v2−v1(t1, t1)) µ(dt1),
15This kind of equilibrium is often called a wolf and sheep equilibrium.
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and
D2(a2) =
∫
T1
∫
a2>a1
(v2−a1) η1(t1, da1)µ(dt1)−
∫
T1
∫
c2>a1
(v2−a1) η1(t1, da1)µ(dt1).
Since a2 < c(t2) and the function b1(t) = v1(t, t) is a strictly increasing bijec-
tion, it is clear that b1−1(a2) < b1−1(c2). Also, in the first integral in D1(a2) we
have v2(t1, t2)− v1(t1, t1) > 0: having t1 < b1−1(c2) implies b1(t1) < c2. Also,
we know
c2 = v2(s1, t2) ≤ v2(t2, t2) = v1(t2, t2) = b1(t2).
Therefore, b1(t1) < b1(t2). Since b1 is strictly increasing, then we can conclude
that t1 < t2. Consequently, we have v1(t1, t1) = v2(t1, t1) < v2(t1, t2). Hence,
we have D1(a2) > 0, for every a2 ∈ (Bt2)ε. So we can choose ξ > 0 small
enough such that
inf
a2∈(Bt2 )ε
D1(a2) > ξ sup
a2∈(Bt2 )ε
D2(a2).
Let ηˆ1 = ξ · η1. Therefore, for every a2 ∈ (Bt2)ε we have∫ b1−1(c2)
t
(v2 − v1(t1, t1)) µ(dt1)−
∫ b1−1(a2)
t
(v2 − v1(t1, t1)) µ(dt1) >∫
T1
∫
a2>a1
(v2 − a1) ηˆ1(t1, da1)µ(dt1)−
∫
T1
∫
c2>a1
(v2 − a1)ηˆ1(t1, da1)µ(dt1) (1)
Assume bidder 1 bids according to
βk1 (t1) = (1− 2δk)bˆ1(t1) + δkb1(t1) + δkηˆ1(t1),
where b1(t1) = v1(t1, t1), and δk → 0 when k → ∞. We prove that for every
t2 ∈ (s1 + λ, s2), bidding according to b˜2(t2) = c(t2) = v2(s1, t2) generates
higher expected payoff compared with bidding a2 ∈ (Bt2)ε against βk1 for every
k.
Take any t2 ∈ (s1 + λ, s2). According to strategy βk1 , bidder 1 bids bˆ1 with
probability 1 − 2δk. It is easy to see that for t1 < s1, we have b˜2 > bˆ1(t1),
therefore bidding b˜2 wins against bˆ1(t1) for t1 < s1. However, for t1 ∈ (s1, s2),
we have
b˜2 = v2(s1, t2) < v2(s1, s2) ≤ v2(t1, s2) = bˆ1(t1).
EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN INTERDEPENDENT VALUE AUCTIONS 17
Also, for t1 > s2, we have b˜2 < bˆ1(t1). Hence, bidding b˜2 loses against bˆ1(t1) for
any t1 > s1.Moreover, according to strategy βk1 , bidder 1 bids b1(t1) = v1(t1, t1)
with probability δk. Bidding b˜2 wins against b1(t1), if b˜2 > b1(t1), in other words
if t1 < b1−1(b˜2). So, bidder 2’s expected payoff by bidding b˜2 against βk1 is
Πb2(β
k
1 , b˜2 | t2) = (1− 2δk)
∫ s1
t
(v2 − v1(t1, t1)) µ(dt1)
+ δk
∫ b1−1(b˜2)
t
(v2 − v1(t1, t1)) µ(dt1)
+ δk
∫
T1
∫
b˜2>a1
(v2 − a1) ηˆ1(t1, da1)µ(dt1).
Similarly, for any a2 ∈ (Bt2)ε, bidder 2’s expected payoff by bidding a2 against
βk1 is
Πb2(β
k
1 , a2 | t2) = (1− 2δk)
∫ s1
t
(v2 − v1(t1, t1)) µ(dt1)
+ δk
∫ b1−1(a2)
t
(v2 − v1(t1, t1)) µ(dt1)
+ δk
∫
T1
∫
a2>a1
(v2 − a1) ηˆ1(t1, da1)µ(dt1).
From inequality (1) we conclude that
Πb2(β
k
1 , a2 | t2) < Πb2(βk1 , b˜2 | t2),
for every t2 ∈ (s1 + λ, s2) and a2 ∈ (Bt2)ε.
Part B. By the Definition 3.1, to prove (bˆ1, bˆ2) is not a DSPE we show that for
the induced distributional strategy profile (γˆ1, γˆ2), there are completely mixed
distributional strategies ν1 and ν2 and sequences of real numbers εk1 and ε
k
2 con-
verging to zero and an ε > 0, such that for γk1 = (1 − ε1k) · γ1 + εk1 · ν1 and
γk2 = (1− ε2k) · γ2 + εk2 · ν2 we have ρw(γk2 , BR2(γk1 )) > ε.
Let ηˆ1 be the completely mixed behavioral strategy that we constructed in part A
and assume bidder 1 bids according to
βk1 (t1) = (1− 2δk)bˆ1(t1) + δkb1(t1) + δkηˆ1(t1),
where b1(t1) = v1(t1, t1), and δk → 0 when k →∞.
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Let β˜k2 (t2, ·) ∈ BR2(t2, βk1 ) for every t2 and every k. Moreover, let γk1 , γ˜k2 , γ1,
and νˆ1 be the distributional strategies induced by βk1 , β˜
k
2 , b1, and ηˆ1 respectively.
One can write
γk1 = (1− 2δk)γˆ1 + δkγ1 + δkνˆ1
So let ν1 =
γ1 + νˆ1
2
and ε1k = 2δk. Also, let ν2 be any complectly mixed strategy
and εk2 = 0 for every k. Then we have γ
k
2 = γˆ2 for every k.
To prove that (bˆ1, bˆ2) is not a DSPE, it is enough to show that for every k
ρw(γk2 , BR2(γ
k
1 )) > ε, or equivalently, it is enough to show that for every k
ρw(γˆ2, BR2(γ
k
1 )) > ε. Moreover, we have γ˜
k
2 ∈ BR2(γk1 ), therefore it is enough
to show that for every k, ρw(γˆ2, γ˜k2 ) > ε.
Take any t2 ∈ (s1 +λ, s2). For every a2 ∈ (Bt2)ε, according to part A, a2 cannot
be a best response against βk1 , for every k. Hence,
β˜k2 (t2, (Bt2)
ε) = 0, for every t2 ∈ (s1 + λ, s2).
Let B = {(t2, a2) | t2 ∈ (s1 + λ+ ε, s2 − ε), a2 ∈ Bt2}. Clearly, B is measur-
able. As bˆ2(t2)(Bt2) = 1
16 and β˜k2 (t2, (Bt2)
ε) = 0, we have
γˆ2(B) =
∫ s2−ε
s1+λ+ε
bˆ2(t2)(Bt2)µ2(dt2) = µ2(s1 + λ+ ε, s2 − ε)
and
γ˜k2 (B
ε) =
∫ s2
s1+λ
β˜k2 (t2, (Bt2)
ε)µ2(dt2) = 0.
Consequently,
γˆ2(B) > γ˜
k
2 (B
ε) + ε,
then ρw(γˆ2, γ˜k2 ) > ε for every k. The proof is complete.
Uniqueness: We do not know whether the DSPE is unique in our model. In gen-
eral, establishing uniqueness of equilibrium is difficult for auction games. For
example, uniqueness of BNE for the first price sealed bid auction with indepen-
dent types is only known within a specific category of bid functions.17
16Notice that bˆ2(t2) is interpreted as a behavioral strategy that assigns probability 1 on bˆ2(t2)
for every t2 ∈ T2.
17See e.g. [37]
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5 Discussion
We introduce the concept of distributional strictly perfect equilibrium (DSPE) as
a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We apply this concept in symmetric
second-price auctions with interdependent values for two bidders to select the
efficient BNE, and to rule out the less intuitive equilibria. In particular, we show
that the efficient BNE discussed in Milgrom [28] is a DSPE. We also show that
DSPE rules out all the discontinuous, inefficient, equilibria introduced by Bir-
ulin [13]. These equilibria feature overbidding and underbidding. Intuitively, we
show that underbidding (overbidding) cannot be a best response against over-
bidding (underbidding), if one bidder bids according to the efficient equilibrium
with a small probability.
In the sealed bid second price auction with more than two bidders with inter-
dependent values, the only part that matters to a bidder is the amount added to
his valuation by the realized types of opponents. The induced probability dis-
tribution, as well as the distribution on highest bids, become more complicated.
But conceptually, adding more players does not seem to introduce any effects
that aren’t already present in the two-bidder case. For that reason, we decided to
analyze the two-bidder case.
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6 Appendix
Lemma 6.1 Let f and g be two continuous functions on an interval [a, b]. For
every k ∈ IN, define
fk(x) = (1− εk)f(x) + εkg(x)
in which εk → 0 as k → ∞. Let yk be a maximizer of fk for every k. Suppose
that function f has a unique maximizer x = y, then yk → y when k →∞.
Proof. We have fk converges to f uniformly. For every k, yk is any maximizer
of fk, which exists since [a, b] is compact. Consider any convergent subsequence
{yk`}∞k`=1 of the sequence {yk}∞k=1. Assume yk` converges to y′ ∈ [a, b] when
k` →∞. Then we have fk`(yk`) ≥ fk`(x) for every x ∈ [a, b]. Now, by uniform
convergence, we have fk`(yk`) −→ f(y′) and fkl(x) −→ f(x), when k` → ∞.
Therefore, we have f(y′) ≥ f(x) for every x ∈ [a, b]. Then, by uniqueness of
maximizer we have y′ = y. Thus, any convergent subsequence has the same
limit y. Hence, we conclude that {yk}∞k=1 is convergent and converges to y when
k →∞.
Lemma 6.2 Consider a Bayesian game Γ. Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be a behav-
ioral strategy profile and γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) be the induced distributional strategy
profile. If γi ∈ BRi(γ), then βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β) for µi-a.e. ti ∈ Ti.
Proof. Suppose for every player i that γi ∈ BRi(γ). Then, we have
Πi(γi, γ−i) ≥ Πi(γ˜i, γ−i),
for every player i’s distributional strategy γ˜i. Therefore, for every player i’s
behavioral strategy β˜i we have∫
Ti
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) µi(dti) ≥
∫
Ti
Πbi(β˜i, β−i | ti) µi(dti). (2)
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Theorem 9.1 in [36] 18 implies that for every player i there is a behavioral strategy
ζi such that ζi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β) for every ti ∈ Ti, which means having type
ti ∈ Ti
Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) ≥ Πbi(ai, β−i | ti),
for every ai ∈ Ai. To prove that βi(ti, ·) for µi-a.e. ti ∈ Ti is a best response for
every player i against β−i, we show that Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) = Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) for
µi-a.e. ti ∈ Ti. Suppose the opposite. First, let
Si =
{
ti ∈ Ti | Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) < Πbi(βi, β−i | ti)
}
.
Clearly, Si is µi-measurable. Suppose µi(Si) > 0. Notice that given ti ∈ Ti, for
βi(ti, ·)-a.e. ai ∈ Ai we have
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) = Πbi(ai, β−i | ti).
Then, given ti ∈ Si, for βi(ti, ·)-a.e. ai ∈ Ai we conclude that
Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) < Πbi(ai, β−i | ti),
which is a contradiction with optimality of ζi for every type. Second, let
Si =
{
ti ∈ Ti | Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) > Πbi(βi, β−i | ti)
}
and suppose µi(Si) > 0. Therefore, we have∫
Si
Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) µi(dti) >
∫
Si
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) µi(dti).
Since ζi(ti, ·) is a best response for every type ti ∈ Ti against β−i, for every
ai ∈ Ai we have
Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) ≥ Πbi(ai, β−i | ti),
18Suppose (T,M) is a measurable space, X is a topological space with the Borel σ-algebra
B, and F is a correspondence from T to X . Denote GrF = {(t, x) : x ∈ F (t)}. Suppose
u : GrF → IR isM⊗B measurable and u(t, ·) is upper semicontinuous on F (t) for t ∈ T , and
let ν(t) = sup{u(x, t) : x ∈ F (t)} for t ∈ T . Theorem 9.1 in [36] states that if F is compact-
valued and measurable, X is separable metric, and u is the limit of a decreasing sequence of
Caratheodory maps, then ν is measurable and there exits f : T → X measurable such that
u(·, f(·)) = ν.
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thus ∫
Ti\Si
Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) µi(dti) ≥
∫
Ti\Si
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) µi(dti).
Consequently,∫
Ti
Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) µi(dti) >
∫
Ti
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) µi(dti).
This is a contradiction with (2). Overall, we showed that if there is a subset of Ti
on which the expected payoff of player i, playing according to ζi is different from
playing according to βi, the measure of that subset is zero. In other words, for
every i there exists a set Si ∈ Ti with µi(Si) = 0 such that for every ti ∈ Ti\Si
we have βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β). This completes the proof.
Lemma 6.3 Consider a Bayesian game Γ. For every player i and every ε > 0,
there is a set E ∈ T such that µ(Ec) < ε and the family {pii(t, ·) | t ∈ E} is
equicontinuous. 19
Proof. Let C(A) be the set of all continuous real functions on A. For every
player i consider the mapping t → pii(t, ·) which is a measurable mapping from
T to C(A). Therefore, the probability measure µ on T induces a probability
measure on C(A), say η. Since A is compact metric space, then C(A) is a
compact separable metric space that implies that η is tight. That means, for
every ε > 0 there is a compact set G ⊂ C(A) with η(Gc) < ε. Let E be the
inverse image ofG under the above mapping. Then we have µ(Ec) < ε. SinceG
is compact, by Ascoli-Arzela theorem one concludes that G is equicontinuous.
This completes the proof.
In the following lemma, we use the following metrics: For every t, s ∈ T and
a, b ∈ A, define
dT (t, s) =
(
n∑
i=1
d2Ti(ti, si)
) 1
2
, dA(a, b) =
(
n∑
i=1
d2Ai(ai, bi)
) 1
2
.
Moreover, let dT×A ((t, a), (s, b)) =
(
d2T (t, s) + d
2
A(a, b)
) 1
2 .
19A family F of real functions on the metric space X is equicontinuous if to every ε > 0
corresponds a δ > 0 such that for every x, y ∈ X with d(x, y) < ε we have |f(x)− f(y)| < δ,
for every f ∈ F.
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Lemma 6.4 Consider a Bayesian game Γ. For every player i and every ε > 0,
there is a set K ∈ T with µ(Kc) < ε such that pii is continuous on K × A for
every i.
Proof. Take ε > 0 and a ∈ A. First we prove that there is a set K ∈ T with
µ(Kc) < ε such that the function pii(·, a) : K → IR is continuous. As A is
separable, it has a countable dense subset, say B. Hence, there exists a sequence
(ak)
∞
k=1 in B such that ak 6= a, for every k, and dA(ak, a) → 0 as k → ∞.
According to Lusin’s Theorem for the collection of the functions {pii(·, ak) |
k = 1, 2, . . .} there is a compact set E ∈ T with µ(Ec) < ε
2
such that pii(·, ak)
is continuous on E for every k ∈ IN. Moreover, by the lemma 6.3 we know that
payoffs are equicontinuous, i.e. there is a set F ∈ T with µ(F c) < ε
2
such that
the collection of the functions {pii(t, ·) : A→ IR | t ∈ F} is equicontinuous. Let
K = E ∩ F . It is clear that µ(Kc) < ε. Moreover, because pii(t, ·) is continuous
in actions for every t ∈ K, the sequence of the functions (pii(·, ak))∞k=1 converges
pointwise to pii(·, a) as k →∞. It is easy to check that equicontinuity of payoffs
and the fact that dA(ak, a)→ 0 as k →∞, implies that the sequence of functions
(pii(·, ak))∞k=1 uniformly converges to pii(·, a) on K as k → ∞. Hence, pii(·, a) :
K → IR is continuous too.
Now, we prove that pii is continuous at (t, a) ∈ K × A. We know that {pii(t, ·) |
t ∈ K} is equicontinuous, then there is a δ1 > 0 such that if dA(a, b) < δ1,
we have |pii(t, a) − pii(t, b)| < ε2 for every t ∈ K. Also, we know pii(·, a)
is continuous at t ∈ K, so there is a δ2 > 0 such that if dT (t, s) < δ2, we
have |pii(t, a) − pii(s, a)| < ε2 . Let δ = min{δ1, δ2}. Then, for every (s, b) ∈
K × A with dT×A((t, a), (s, b)) < δ we have dA(a, b) < δ1 and dT (s, t) < δ2.
Consequently, we have
|pii(t, a)−pii(s, b)| < |pii(t, a)−pii(s, a)|+ |pii(s, a)−pii(s, b)| < ε
2
+
ε
2
= ε.
This proves that pii is continuous on K × A.
Lemma 6.4 gives a slightly more general result than Lusin’s theorem. Indeed,
Lusin’s theorem would guarantee the existence of a subset of T × A such that
pii is continuous on that subset, while Lemma 6.4 would do that for a set of the
form K × A, where K ⊆ T .
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The following lemma is the basic continuity result in Milgrom and Weber [29].
Here we provide a detailed proof of that.
Lemma 6.5 Consider a Bayesian game Γ. For every player i, the function Πi :
∆→ IR is continuous with respect to the weak metric on ∆.
Proof. To prove that Πi is continuous at a distributional strategy profile γ, let
(γk)∞k=1 be a sequence of distributional strategy profiles converging to γ with
respect to the weak metric as k → ∞. Now, by Lemma 6.4, for every i and
every δ > 0, there exist a continuous and bounded function vδ : T ×A→ IR and
a set K ∈ T such that µ(Kc) < δ, and vδ = pii on K × A.
As µ(Kc) < δ, we have γk(Kc×A) < δ, for every k. Similarly, γ(Kc×A) < δ.
Moreover, because vδ and pii are bounded, there is anM > 0 such that |pii−vδ| ≤
M . Hence, for every k we have∫
T×A
|pii − vδ|f(t) dγk =
∫
Kc×A
|pii − vδ|f(t) dγk ≤M · δ.
Similarly,∫
T×A
|pii − vδ|f(t) dγ =
∫
Kc×A
|pii − vδ|f(t) dγ ≤M · δ.
Furthermore, as f is µˆ-integrable, there is a sequence (f`)∞`=1 of bounded and
continuous functions such that
∫
T
|f(t)− f`(t)|µˆ(dt)→ 0, as `→∞. We have
|Πi(γk)− Πi(γ)| = |
∫
piif(t)dγ
k −
∫
piif(t)dγ|
≤
∫
|pii − vδ|f(t)dγk +
∫
|f(t)− f`(t)|vδdγk
+ |
∫
vδf`(t)dγ
k −
∫
vδf`(t)dγ|
+
∫
|f(t)− f`(t)|vδdγ +
∫
|pii − vδ|f(t)dγ
≤ 2Mδ +
∫
|f(t)− f`(t)|vδdγk
+ |
∫
vδf`dγ
k −
∫
vδf`dγ|+
∫
|f(t)− f`(t)|vδdγ.
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Hence, |Πi(γk) − Πi(γ)| converges to zero when k → ∞, ` → ∞, and δ → 0.
This proves that Πi is continuous at γ.
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be a DSPE. By Definition 3.1, for every completely mixed
strategy profile ν = (ν1, . . . , νn) and every sequence (εki )
∞
k=1 of real numbers
converging to zero, the sequence (γki )
∞
k=1 defined by γ
k
i = (1− εik) · γi + εki · νi,
for every i, is such that
lim
k→∞
ρw(γki , BRi(γ
k)) = 0.
Clearly lim
k→∞
ρw(γki , γi) = 0. Therefore, for every i, there exists a sequence
(γˆki )
∞
k=1 such that γˆ
k
i ∈ BRi(γk) for every k ∈ IN and ρw(γki , γˆki )→ 0 as k →∞.
By the triangle inequality for ρw this implies for every i that ρw(γi, γˆki ) → 0 as
k →∞. Now, by Lemma 6.5 we conclude the upper hemicontinuity of the cor-
respondence BRi, for every player i. Hence, γi ∈ BRi(γ). Now, by Lemma
6.2 we have βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β) for µi-a.e. ti ∈ Ti. In other words, for every
i there exists a set Si ∈ Ti with µi(Si) = 0 such that for every ti ∈ Ti\Si we
have βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β). Now, define βˆ = (βˆ1, . . . , βˆn) by letting βˆi(ti, ·) =
βi(ti, ·) for every ti ∈ Ti\Si and selecting any βˆi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β) for every
ti ∈ Si. It is clear that βˆ is a BNE and satisfies the requirement of the proposi-
tion.
Existence proof of distributional perfect BNE
We prove the existence of a distributional perfect BNE, with the help of the
following fixed point theorem from Glicksberg [17].
Theorem 6.6 Let S be a nonempty compact and convex subset of a locally con-
vex Hausdorff space. Let F : S  S be an upper hemicontinuous correspon-
dence with nonempty and convex values. Then, F has a fixed point.
Theorem 6.7 The set of distributional perfect BNEs is nonempty.
First we prove that the set of distributional strategy profiles satisfying the con-
ditions in the definition of distributional perfect equilibrium is not empty. For
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every player i, let νi be a completely mixed distributional strategy. Note that
such a νi exists, because Ti × Ai is separable. Define for every k ∈ IN
∆i(k) = {γi ∈ ∆i | γi(Bi) ≥ 1
k
· νi(Bi), ∀Bi ∈ Ti ⊗Ai}.
Moreover, let ∆(k) = ×ni=1∆i(k) andBRki : ∆(k) ∆i(k) be the best response
correspondence for player i restricted to ∆i(k)20 and define the correspondence
BRk : ∆(k) ∆(k) to be
BRk(γ) = ×ni=1BRki (γ),
for every γ ∈ ∆(k). We verify the conditions of Theorem 6.6 for the correspon-
dence BRk.
Since T is a complete and separable metric space, by Theorem 1.4 in [12] µ is
a tight measure.21 This fact together with the compactness of the set A implies
that ∆i is a tight set of probability measures.22 Now, by Prohorov’s Theorem
we conclude that ∆i is a compact metric space with respect to the weak metric.
It is easy to see that ∆i(k) is a closed subset of ∆i with respect to the strong
metric. Consequently, by Theorem V.3.13 in [16], it is closed with respect to the
weak metric. Hence, ∆i(k) is compact with respect to the weak metric. Also,
one can easily check that ∆i(k) is convex. Moreover, upper hemicontinuity of
BRk follows by Lemma 6.5. Now, we apply Theorem 6.6, which leads us to the
existence of an equilibrium point γk ∈ ∆(k), for every k.
Now, define23
PBRi(γ) = {(ti, ai) ∈ Ti × Ai | (ti, ai) ∈ supp(γi) and γi ∈ BRi(γ)} .
It is clear that γki
(
PBRi(γ
k)
) ≥ 1 − 1
k
νi(Ti × Ai) = 1 − 1k . This implies that
ρw(γki , BRi(γ
k)) ≤ 1
k
. Furthermore, as ∆i is compact with respect to the weak
20Distributional strategy γi of player i is a best response restricted to ∆i(k) against a distri-
butional strategy profile η−i ∈ ∆−i(k), if Πi(γi, η−i) ≥ Πi(γ˜i, η−i), for every distributional
strategy γ˜i ∈ ∆i(k) of player i.
21Let X be a metric space with the Borel σ-field Σ. A measure µ on Σ is tight if for every
G ∈ Σ, µ(G) = sup{µ(K) | K ⊂ G, and K compact}. Moreover, Theorem 1.4 in [12] states
that if X is separable and complete, then each probability measure on Σ is tight.
22A family of probability measures on a metric space is tight if for every ε > 0 there is a
compact set K satisfying µ(K) > 1− ε, for every µ in the family.
23Recall that supp(µ) = {x ∈ X | for every open set G if x ∈ G then µ(G) > 0} .
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metric, without loss of generality we can assume that there is a distributional
strategy profile γ such that ρw(γk, γ) → 0 when k → ∞. Let β be a behavioral
strategy profile corresponding to γ. Obviously, β is distributionally perfect.
Now, we show that there is a BNE βˆ such that for µi-a.e. ti ∈ Ti we have
βi(ti, ·) = βˆi(ti, ·), for every player i. Then, since β is distributionally perfect,
trivially the BNE βˆ is also distributionally perfect. Hence, the set of distribu-
tional perfect BNEs is nonempty, as desired.
Since β = (β1, . . . , βn) is distributionally perfect, by definition we know that
for the induced distributional strategy profile γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) there exists a
sequence (γk)∞k=1 = (γ
k
1 , . . . , γ
k
n)
∞
k=1 of completely mixed distributional strategy
profiles such that for every player i we have lim
k→∞
ρw(γki , γi) = 0 and
lim
k→∞
ρw(γki , BRi(γ
k)) = 0.
Therefore, for every i, there exists a sequence (γˆki )
∞
k=1 such that γˆ
k
i ∈ BRi(γk)
for every k ∈ IN and ρw(γki , γˆki ) → 0 as k → ∞. By the triangle inequality for
ρw this implies for every i that ρw(γi, γˆki ) → 0 as k → ∞. Now, by Lemma
6.5 we conclude the upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence BRi, for every
player i. Hence, γi ∈ BRi(γ).
Now, by Lemma 6.2 we have βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β) for µi-a.e. ti ∈ Ti. In other
words, for every i there exists a set Si ∈ Ti with µi(Si) = 0 such that for every
ti ∈ Ti\Si we have βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β). Define βˆ = (βˆ1, . . . , βˆn) by letting
βˆi(ti, ·) = βi(ti, ·) for every ti ∈ Ti\Si and selecting any βˆi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β)
for every ti ∈ Si. Note that the result of this selection is measurable. Clearly, βˆ
is a BNE and satisfies the requirement of the definition.
